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Choosing the correct principles of justice for the 
basic structure of society is a difficult task and it 
is natural to search for a procedure that will help us 
in that task. Suppose we refer to the situation we 
find ourselves in when we want to know what the correct 
principles of justice are as the initial situation. 
Our problem is then to describe this situation, to 
identify its most important elements. Understanding 
our problem better will hopefully mean that its solu-
tion will be easier. We might require that the reason-
ing in such a situation be logical, consistent and con-
form to generally accepted rules of evidence and argu-
mentation, but it is not hard to see that such stipula-
tions will not take us very far. It will then be 
necessary to develop an interpretation of the initial 
situation that will enable us to determine which set of 
principles is the most reasonable set for us. 
In A Theory of Justice John Rawls refers to the 
original position as the "most philosophically favored 
interpretation" of the initial situation.' About the 
initial situation itself he says: 
There are, as I have said, many possible inter-
pretations of the initial situation. This con-
ception varies depending upon how the contracting 
parties are conceived, upon what their beliefs 
and interests are said to be, upon which alterna-
tives are available to them, and so on. In this 
sense, there are many different contract theo-
ries. Justice as fairness is but one of these. 
But the question of justification is settled, as 
far as it can be, by showing that there is one 
interpretation of the initial situation which 
best expresses the conditions that are widely 
thought reasonable to impose on the choice of 
principles yet which, at the same time, leads to 
a conception that characterizes our considered 
judgments in reflective equilibrium. This most 
favored, or standard, interpretation I shall re-
fer to as the original position. 1 
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Rawls remarks frequently that the elements of the 
original position and other parts of his theory are 
'reasonable', 'fitting', and 'natural'. But he says 
relatively little about the initial situation and how 
it fits in with the other parts of his theory. In this 
essay I will attempt to describe what exactly the ini-
tial situation is, how it can help us to understand how 
the various elements of Rawls' theory fit together, and 
why we should regard its interpretation as an important 
task for political philosophy. The interpretation 
procedure will lead to the idea of a wide reflective 
equilibrium. I will also consider one objection to 
such a procedure and try to show that it fails, but in 
the main I will simply try to describe how we can con-
struct the elements of Rawls' theory from the idea of 
the initial situation. 
Two further points must be noted. The first is 
that although I shall conceive of the interpretation of 
the initial situation as being a practical task, such 
an interpretation will inevitably look something like a 
philosophical ideal. Since any interpretation of such 
a situation will have to simplify and generalize about 
a complex set of considerations, such a simplification 
will lead to a procedure that cannot be used for all of 
the cases that might be considered. The second point 
is that although I will stick pretty close to Rawls' 
way of arguing for his conception of justice, I shall 
try to move beyond it in a way that I hope will be com-
patible with it. 
Further, this essay is not an argument for Rawls' 
conception of the initial situation but rather an expo-
sition of the interpretation I see implicit within A 
Theory of Justice. An argument for Rawls' particular 
way of interpreting the initial situation would have to 
canvass all of the possible rival interpretations and 
show why they are unreasonable. Such a vast project is 
obviously beyond the scope of this essay. But my dis-
cussion will suggest why Rawls' interpretation is more 
reasonable vis-a-vis its main competitor, utilitari-
anism. 
Suppose there is a public culture, in democracies a 
democratic public culture which can be thought of as 
the sum of public discussion on questions of justice, 
including the question of which principles of justice 
are best for that culture. There are fundamental disa-
greements between the participants in the discussion 
over which principles are best but there is also 
agreement on certain matters. Indeed, one of the pre-
requisites for there being a public culture is a mea-
sure of agreement among the participants. But although 
the participants share common concepts, there is presu-
mably dispute over how these fundamental concepts are 
to be interpreted. The important point is that within 
a culture there will be a large measure of adherence to 
certain general concepts as well as specific moral 
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judgments among most if not all members of that 
culture. Any theory of justice that does not take this 
kind of broad agreement into account runs the risk of 
simply not being relevant to our particular public 
culture. Certainly a theory can suggest that we reform 
our interpretations of some of our fundamental con-
cepts, perhaps even that we abandon them. But any 
theory that in effect suggests that we abandon a sig-
nificant portion of our total system of beliefs will 
simply be rejected out of hand. There are very few 
theories that even attempt to persuade us to do this. 
Most theories of justice appeal to us on the basis that 
they give a better rendering to the concepts we already 
have on hand. The theories that suggest we overthrow 
all of our important concepts with regard to justice 
are regarded with suspicion. The concepts we already 
have allow a lot of latitude in interpretation and to 
demand their overthrow demands that we abandon much 
that we agree with for an unknown ideal. The burden of 
proof placed on such theories in view of such enormous 
risks is usually too great for them to bear. 
Although there are disagreements in any democratic 
public culture, the participants may still wonder 
whether there is any one conception of justice that 
will settle the important questions of social justice 
once and for all. Failing that, they may wonder how to 
determine what the best conception of justice available 
is, not the best theory in some absolute sense but sim-
ply the best theory among all of the available alterna-
tives. Once the participants in the discussion have 
asked themselves that question, they are in the initial 
situation. As I stated above, the problem is then to 
describe this situation to make our decision easier. 
How should we go about answering such a question? 
The first point to make is that there is no lack of 
theories or suggestions as to the principles we should 
use to organize our political, social and economic 
life. In fact, one of our main problems in construct-
ing a theory of justice is that we have too many theo-
ries. We also have a superabundance of information 
that forms the background for testing those theories. 
The theories I refer to are not simply the philosophi-
cal theories on Rawls' list (intuition!sm, utilitarian-
ism and perfectionism). There are also theories about 
politics written by political scientists, theories 
about how to run an economy efficiently and fairly by 
economists and theories about how society should be or-
ganized written by sociologists. Add to these theories 
the relevant aspects of theories offered by other aca-
demic disciplines (legal, psychological and anthropo-
logical theories) as well as the intellectual history 
of the fundamental concepts being discussed and the 
relevant- thoughts and knowledge of politicians, scien-
tists, artists and laymen and we have a truly enormous 
set of materials. 
52 
The people in the initial situation thus face a 
staggering task. This point is worth emphasizing. 
Whatever theory of justice we eventually decide on, and 
no matter how much the initial situation is simplified 
to make our choice easier, the theory of justice that 
emerges at the end of this process will be extremely 
complex. A simple theory, a set of principles without 
any detailed explanation will not even qualify as a 
proper theory. So we have reached our first tentative 
conclusion about the proper interpretation of the ini-
tial situation. The theory that results from such a 
situation will have to be a comprehensive, complex the-
ory. No matter how interesting a theory may look at 
one level (philosophical, political etc.), it cannot be 
counted as a real alternative for us unless it can work 
at least to a certain extent at all levels of theory 
simultaneously. At this point it is worth recalling 
what Rawls says in the Preface to A Theory of Justice 
about utilitarianism. He remarks that one reason util-
itarianism is such a powerful theory is that its creat-
ors were not simply philosophers but also economists 
and social theorists. They understood utilitarianism 
to be not simply a moral theory but a wider theory that 
applied to many questions of their democratic public 
culture. The implication is that to develop a workable 
alternative to utilitarianism we will need to create a 
theory that can work in the same general way, not just 
as a philosophical theory but a philosophical theory 
that has clear political, economic and social implica-
tions. 
Now we can state a second consideration that in-
forms our description of the initial situation. The 
theory that we need must be one that can actually work 
in the world as we know it. Specifically it should be 
possible to institutionalize the principles of justice 
we endorse and we should be able to describe these in-
stitutions in some detail. The theory is not much good 
if it leaves to the imagination how the principles are 
to work in the actual circumstances in which questions 
of justice first arise. If our current institutions re-
quire some changes, the theory should be able to tell 
us what changes are necessary. This stipulation fur-
ther guards against the possibility that the philo-
sophical theory will provide us with unrealistic prin-
ciples, principles that could not be adhered to in the 
world as we know it. 
A third consideration can be inferred from the 
above remarks. In the initial situation, we must take 
account of the fact that persons do not approach the 
arguments of moral philosophers without previous com-
mitments. Persons in a particular democratic public 
culture have strong moral commitments to certain i-
deals. A theory of justice must take some account of 
this fact or risk being irrelevant to that culture. 
Rawls works this idea into his theory through the no-
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tion of a considered judgment. Examples of considered 
judgments in our public culture include the idea that 
slavery is wrong, that religious toleration should be 
encouraged and that a person's freedom of conscience 
ought to be preserved. I want to expand further on 
this idea of a considered judgment to show how it can 
be applied to our specific democratic public culture. 
The first point to make is that these considered 
judgments are public considered judgments. It is not 
enough for one person to say that he has thought a 
moral question over carefully in a cool hour and then 
demand that his judgment be incorporated into the 
theory of justice for his public culture. The judgment 
must be a publicly shared judgment in some sense. I 
noted above that one of the prerequisites for there be-
ing a public culture in the first place was that agree-
ment be present among the members of that culture on 
some fundamental ideals. These ideals can serve as the 
considered judgments that we use in the theory. Per-
haps some of them are set forth in a constitution or 
some other public document that are recognized as stat-
ing the ideals of that culture. There may be in fact 
many different forms that the public considered judg-
ments of a democratic culture can take. But we will be 
on fairly safe ground if we select what look to be the 
strongest and most widely agreed upon judgments. 
A second point is that these judgments will nor-
mally have their own history, independent of any gen-
eral moral theory. They will have an independent in-
tellectual history, which is only to say that people 
have thought about the judgments in the past and argued 
for them in their present form on the basis of whatever 
considerations they could bring to bear. Think of the 
example of opposition to slavery in the United States. 
Citizens wrote books, articles, pamphlets on this 
question discussing the issue from all sides, offering 
arguments against the practice that were both pragmatic 
(slavery does not help us, our economy would be better 
off without it) and moral (slavery is wrong and unjust, 
it should be eliminated). Over time, a consensus built 
up in our public culture that slavery in any form was 
unjust. Later that judgment was extended to include 
all of the various forms of racial oppression. Much of 
this discussion offered arguments that did not depend 
on any comprehensive moral theory for their argumenta-
tive force. 
These judgments do not only have the backing of a 
strong intellectual tradition. They also have the 
backing of history itself, which is to say that the 
judgments have stood the test of time. People have not 
simply accepted these ideals in an intellectual way but 
they have been willing to act on them and so change 
history by their actions. Perhaps they have risked 
their lives for such ideals or devoted their efforts to 
working to see that these ideals are fully institution-
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alized. In any case, the. fact that these judgments 
have moved people to action means that they have a spe-
cial significance for the persons within that public 
culture. So in our interpretation of the initial situ-
ation we must find a place for these judgments. We may 
not regard these judgments as final arbiters of whether 
our theory is a good one but we might regard them as 
provisional points against which our theory is to be 
tested. 
There is an objection to this way of proceeding 
that has been made by Richard Brandt. Part of the ob-
jection may have already been answered in terms of the 
requirement that the considered judgments cannot be 
private judgments and that they must have some validat-
ing independent intellectual history. But I think that 
Brandt would still object to this way of proceeding de-
spite the explanation I have given. Brandt argues: 
In the case of normative beliefs, no reason has 
been offered why we should think that initial 
credence levels, for a person, correspond to 
credibilities. The fact that a person has a firm 
normative conviction gives that belief a status 
no better than fiction. Is one coherent set of 
fictions supposed to be better than another? . . 
. What we should aim to do is step outside our 
own tradition somehow, see it from the outside, 
and evaluate it, separating what is only the 
vestige of a possibly once useful moral tradition 
from what is justifiable at present. The method 
of intuitions in principle prohibits our doing 
this. It is only an internal test of coherence, 
what may be no more than a reshuffling of moral 
prejudices. 3 
From what I have argued above, it should be clear 
why we should regard these judgments as more than mere 
fictions. They are part of what we are and we could no 
more abandon these fundamental judgments than we could 
change our form. But we do not simply accept these 
judgments on faith and they are not intuitions in the 
sense that we are expected to 'see' that they are true. 
We can understand that they are correct because there 
are public arguments in their favor and because we can 
actually observe their beneficial effects by examining 
our history and by seeing how they are working today. 
As Norman Daniels argues, these considered judgments 
should not be understood as some sort of foundational 
intuition, a glimpse into some fundamental moral real-
ity.* Rather they are revisable in some sense. This 
may be hard to see if we adhere to the examples I used 
above. Are our judgments as to the wrongness of slav-
ery or the rightness of religious toleration to be 
revisable? Perhaps the exact way of institutionalizing 
these judgments is open to interpretation but the point 
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to make here is that I have so far used as examples 
only some of the strongest considered judgments that we 
have. We may assume that there is a much larger class 
of considered judgments that does not have the powerful 
historical backing of the examples already mentioned 
but yet have a hold on our opinions. Seen in the light 
of a comprehensive theory of justice, we may want to 
revise these judgments in the manner that Rawls 
describes.* 
Now let us examine the charge that these judgments 
are fictions a little more closely. Suppose the con-
sidered judgments we have in mind are the first, 
fourth, fifth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments to the 
Bill of Rights. I would suggest that these statements 
of what every citizen in our democracy is guaranteed 
have a long intellectual history behind them, an intel-
lectual history that can be understood independently of 
the history of the moral theories offered by philoso-
phers. The writings that support these ideas have a 
powerful hold on our opinions and give considerations 
which are sufficient to determine the intellect. These 
ideas have also moved men to action, possibly even to 
sacrifice their lives so that the institutions that 
protect these ideas could be preserved. To suggest 
that these ideas (ideas which Rawls clearly draws on) 
are fictions is at best a silly suggestion and at worst 
a suggestion that those who acted on those ideas did so 
without good reason since (according to Brandt) they 
were acting on a mere fiction. 
Before leaving this objection, I want to consider 
the idea that we should find a way as Brandt suggests, 
of standing outside our own set of beliefs in order to 
better determine whether they are true. In the lan-
guage I have used in this essay this would mean that we 
should abstract ourselves from our own democratic pub-
lic culture in order to determine which judgments in 
our culture are true and which are false using some 
standard independent of our culture. Now whatever one 
thinks about such a project, it should be evident that 
such a task places an unbearable strain on our ability 
to construct a proper theory. Constructing a theory 
within the context of a particular public culture is 
hard enough as explained above, but to go further and 
require that we gaze at our culture along with all 
other cultures from some perspective outside of them is 
to require the impossible. Here we enter the realm of 
some sort of ideal observer theory. Perhaps God or an 
ideal observer could perform this task, but we surely 
cannot. We can however make progress by recognizing 
what the initial situation is and by realizing that a 
great deal of work has already been done for us in 
terms of the kinds of considered judgments dealt with 
above. The fact that a great deal of discussion has 
already gone on in our culture over matters relevant to 
a theory of justice can be of great assistance to us. 
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We must keep in mind that what we are aiming at is a 
theory--not a perfect theory but most likely a theory 
full of problems and flaws, a theory that represents 
the best we can do given the magnitude of the job we 
have taken on. To ask that we forget the thinking 
about these matters that has gone on before we arrived 
on the scene is to ask that we assume the kind of om-
niscience that only an ideal observer could lay claim 
to. We may further ask why we should want to stand out-
side our public culture. Given that our culture is not 
a static one, that there are many ideas that need in-
terpretation, explanation and revising in the light of 
the need for a general theory of justice, why should we 
want to take on a larger task than this? 
If we look at Rawls* theory in the light of what I 
have just argued, it is clear that we will have to 
abandon the idea that the theory of justice can be 
valid from all temporal perspectives. Rawls seems to 
endorse this general way of looking at things in his 
latest article: 
|W]e are not trying to find a conception of 
justice suitable for all societies regardless of 
their particular social or historical circum-
stances. We want to settle a fundamental disa-
greement over the just form of basic institutions 
within a democratic society under modern 
conditions. We look to ourselves and to our fu-
ture, and reflect upon our disputes since, let's 
say, the Declaration of Independence . . . . The 
aim of political philosophy, when it presents it-
self in the public culture of a democratic 
society, is to articulate and to make explicit 
those snared notions and principles thought to be 
already latent in common sense; or, as is often 
the case, if common sense is hesitant and uncer-
tain, and doesn't know what to think, to propose 
to it certain conceptions and principles conge-
nial to its most essential convictions and 
historical traditions.' 
One final stipulation as to the nature of the ini-
tial situation can be inferred from the foregoing 
discussion. Given the magnitude of our task we will 
want to both restrict the scope of our inquiry and the 
information we have to consider. As to the scope of 
the inquiry, Rawls limits it just to a theory of jus-
tice which he says is only one part of a moral view and 
only part of an overall social ideal. As to the in-
formation we consider, Rawls not only restricts the 
information we can use but starts from a position of no 
information at all. He then permits only enough infor-
mation to the parties in the original position to allow 
them to reach agreement. But we can think of this con-
dition as an agreement among the parties in the initial 
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Situation to exclude the information they feel is 
morally irrelevant to their decision as to which prin-
ciples of justice are best for them. Obviously this 
means that we need an account of what kind of informa-
tion is irrelevant from a moral point of view. But if 
we do have such a theory then our task will be much 
easier. 
At this point it is appropriate to introduce the 
idea of a wide reflective equilibrium. A narrow re-
flective equilibrium involves choosing principles of 
justice for the basic structure of society by moving 
back and forth from a set of considered judgments to a 
suggested set of principles and adjusting one or the 
other as seems appropriate. Rawls conceives of a wide 
reflective equilibrium as a process of comparing dif-
ferent moral conceptions in order to discover which 
conception will best survive philosophical scrutiny and 
therefore become the most favored conception.' 
I will use the idea of a wide reflective equili-
brium in a different way. A wide reflective equili-
brium develops out of the interpretation of the initial 
situation as that interpretation identifies the various 
essential elements needed to construct the kind of 
theory of justice that we need. Specifying these ele-
ments and examining the ways in which they interact 
will hopefully make the complex task of theory con-
struction easier. In a wide reflective equilibrium as 
I conceive it, we are not comparing alternative moral 
conceptions but specifying the structure of our theory 
of justice as it develops from the most reasonable in-
terpretation of the initial situation. 
We now have several of the background elements of 
our wide reflective equilibrium in place. We know that 
our theory must be comprehensive, workable in the real 
world, that it should be possible to illustrate how the 
principles are to be implemented in a specific set of 
institutions, that we should give a role to our consid-
ered judgments when selecting the principles of justice 
and that we need to decide on some legitimate way to 
restrict the information available to the parties. 
Now that we have the backgound elements of our wide 
reflective equilibrium in place, we can consider how we 
can move from the notion of an initial situation to the 
three central elements of the equilibrium: the concep-
tion of the person, the original position and the con-
cept of a well-ordered society. My treatment of these 
elements in Rawls' theory is not intended to be exhaus-
tive or comprehensive. I want to explain why these 
concepts are important from the standpoint of the ini-
tial situation and describe the main ways in which the 
concepts interact. 
Recall the nature of the initial situation. We are 
in a democratic public culture, trying to discover the 
bases of agreement that we can use to construct a 
theory of justice. We try to specify the main ideas 
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that we have to take account of in order to formulate 
an adequate theory. The reasons for the requirements 
already discussed were fairly practical. Since we 
wanted a theory that would have relevance to the world 
as we know it, we specified that the principles should 
be testable against the reality of the world. Now the 
need for a conception of the person and of a well-
ordered society looks very justifiable if we look at 
the problem from the standpoint of the initial situa-
tion. We need to know in a general way what kind of 
persons we are as well as what kind of persons we hope 
to be. A clear conception of the person will also 
guard against the possibility that our theory of 
justice could make extreme demands on the personalities 
of individuals, forcing them to become radically dif-
ferent types of persons in order to conform to the 
principles of the theory. It also ensures that we can 
incorporate into our theory an emphasis on a particular 
ideal of the person, an ideal that we hope to better 
approximate by constructing our institutions in such a 
way that a tendency towards the ideal way of being is 
reinforced by those institutions. We also need to know 
in a general way what kind of society we would like to 
live in. We are not here specifying a social ideal, 
but the minimum conditions we would like our conception 
of justice to satisfy in terms of how the principles we 
choose specify the kind of society that we are to have. 
Finally, the need for some central decision making 
procedure to select the principles of justice from the 
available alternatives, principles which we then test 
against the background of the wide reflective equili-
brium is fairly obvious. Presumably the decision 
procedure (the original position) can be specified by 
identifying the kinds of principles we want (general, 
universal, ordered) and by borrowing from the other 
elements of the reflective equilibrium in a manner that 
I will describe. But I will not pursue the exact de-
scription of the original position further. I only 
want to characterize these three central elements in a 
general way. 
What conception of the person should we use? Rawls 
suggests that the concept of a free and equal person 
satisfies our need for a general conception which com-
bines both a description of what we are and an ideal of 
the person that we can aspire to. How are persons con-
sidered to be free? On Rawls' account, this concept of 
freedom is expressed in two main ways: persons should 
be free of contingencies that are arbitrary from a 
moral point of view and persons do not see themselves 
as tied down to any fundamental set of interests, they 
wish to preserve their liberty to revise their inter-
ests over time. As far as the idea of being an equal 
moral person is concerned, this is satisfied if persons 
possess two capacities: the capacity to form a concep-
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tion of the good and the capacity to have a sense of 
justice.• 
The main way in which this conception of the person 
contributes to the original position is through the no-
tion of the veil of ignorance. The veil screens out 
the knowledge of the arbitrary contingencies that could 
bias our judgment as well as precluding knowledge of 
our particular conception of the good, thus ensuring 
that the principles of justice chosen do not favor any 
one conception of the good. The veil ensures equality 
between persons by giving all participants access to 
the same information so that all are equally situated. 
The veil cannot be understood as simply an effort to a-
chieve impartiality but as an effort to ensure that a 
certain conception of the person is reflected in the 
original position.* Further, the motivation assumption 
of mutual disinterest ensures a measure of freedom to 
the parties by not requiring that they not take extreme 
motivations such as egoism or altruism as primary. 
Mutual disinterest as a condition seems to be a reas-
onable compromise between two unattractive extremes. 
What should we say about Rawls' conception of the 
person from the standpoint of our democratic public 
culture? Trying to separate out a conception of the 
person from the complex milieu of a public culture that 
will in a general way describe the aspects of the con-
ception of the person supported by that culture is ob-
viously a difficult task. Perhaps we should regard any 
such conception as only provisional, to be evaluated 
later in the light of the principles the theory se-
lects. But Rawls' conception is certainly a plausible 
one. It focuses our attention on two fundamental ele-
ments in our public culture: the freedom and equality 
of the individual. It seeks to characterize these two 
elements in terms of their basic thrust: freedom from 
forces outside of the individual and equality as an em-
pirical equality, something we can observe in other 
persons. Rawls then seeks a way to ensure that the 
decision procedure will reflect this conception in some 
way and he uses the veil of ignorance to achieve this 
end. But the idea of a veil of ignorance can be under-
stood as a very practical one from the perspective of 
our public culture. It is practical in the sense that 
we constantly try in arguing about questions of justice 
to free ourselves from the effects of bias and 
prejudice. We criticize others if their judgments re-
flect some bias and we are chastened if someone esta-
blishes to us that such undesirable factors have in-
fluenced our own judgment. The effort to view the 
world not just from an individual perspective but as an 
individual looking at matters from a social perspective 
is something that we try to do every time we argue 
about controversial questions. The veil of ignorance 
can be understood as an extension of this familiar idea 
that we should try as far as possible to free ourselves 
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from the influence of prejudice. It is so natural in 
fact, that I think it would be a good thing if Rawls 
just dropped the idea of a veil. It is a powerful idea 
but perhaps it is too powerful. It leads other philo-
sophers to emphasize how strange it is that we should 
be suddenly deprived of much of the knowledge with 
which we normally confront the world. Instead the em-
phasis should be on the fact that this process is 
something we try to do every time we argue about 
questions of justice in everyday life and hence we 
should want it to be part of our decision procedure. 
So there are some grounds for believing that Rawls' 
conception of the person is plausible in terms of our 
democratic public culture. 
The main elements of the Rawlsian notion of a well-
ordered society are two: the society is regulated by a 
public conception of justice and the society is stable. 
Public principles of justice regulate the basic struc-
ture of society and the institutions of that society 
are presumed to satisfy those principles. This kind of 
public justice helps a well-ordered society to be sta-
ble since all citizens know what the conception of 
justice is, how it is justified and that the institu-
tions of their society satisfy this conception. The 
element of stability also means that the society is or-
dered so that it will tend toward social equilibrium: 
defects that develop in any one part of the society 
will over time be remedied or compensated for and the 
principles of justice that regulate the society will 
generate their own support among the citizenry.1* 
From the perspective of the initial situation, 
these conditions are very reasonable. One of the basic 
aspects of the initial situation in a democratic public 
culture is that it is a public situation, we are openly 
searching from the correct principles of justice. If 
we conceived of our task in another way, say to search 
for the principles of justice embedded in a transcen-
dent reality that could only be apprehended by a select 
few then we could permit ourselves to search for prin-
ciples that perhaps would not be made public for fear 
that they would be misinterpreted by the unenlightened. 
But we are not in that situation. We are in a situa-
tion where people are arguing about which principles of 
justice will be most justifiable in the light of gener-
ally accepted beliefs concerning reasoning and evi-
dence. Such persons are not about to accept the sup-
posed privileged insights of those who claim an insight 
through revelation into a more permanent reality. For 
that matter, these persons are also not about to accept 
principles that are so complicated that they could only 
be understood by experts. Such claims are simply ir-
relevant from the standpoint of persons in a democratic 
public culture. The criterion of stability also seems 
to be a good idea. Surely we are interested in a so-
ciety that will not fly apart when it is challenged by 
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outside forces or unexpected defects. As mentioned 
above we want to construct a society that will be flex-
ible and compensate for any problems that arise. 
The stipulation that the theory that results from 
the original position must be a public theory is the 
main element that the notion of a well-ordered society 
contributes to the original position. Rawls uses the 
idea that a conception of justice must be public to ar-
gue that utilitarianism would not be chosen in the 
original position. 1 1 Since utilitarianism would 
require an extreme amount of sympathy and benevolence 
in order to have internal stability, the parties would 
be less likely to choose it than a conception which re-
lied on the basic idea of reciprocal advantage. But 
there is no argument that this criterion of publicity 
applies to all moral judgments. 1 1 It is a special 
requirement engendered by the particular needs of the 
initial situation. This further illustrates how the 
construction of a theory of social justice is a very 
practical affair. We are not limited solely to the 
formal requirements of morality (universality for exam-
ple) to help us in the selection of principles. We can 
add new conditions to the selection process if they are 
warranted by the interpretation of the initial situa-
tion. 
All of the elements of the Rawlsian wide reflective 
equilibrium as I conceive it are now accounted for. We 
think of our task as describing the situation we are in 
when we argue which principles of justice would be best 
for our democratic public culture to adopt. We arrive 
at two conceptions, a conception of the person and a 
conception of a well-ordered society that seem espe-
cially important to our decision. We also construct a 
decision procedure called the original position that 
takes important elements from the first two conceptions 
along with other stipulations that seem appropriate 
(such as the theory of social primary goods, rational-
ity, conception of the good and the formal constraints 
on the concept of right; elements of the original posi-
tion not discussed in this essay) and that also presu-
mably can be accounted for from the perspective of the 
initial situation. After we rank conceptions of jus-
tice using our decision procedure we check to see if 
the favored conception can be applied to a set of in-
stitutions, whether such an application is feasible, 
and whether this whole conception matches our consid-
ered public judgments. 
This wide reflective equilibrium is surrounded and 
permeated by our particular democratic public culture. 
This is where our arguments originate and where they 
end in a particular conception of justice. Where we 
are uncertain as to how to proceed in our argument, we 
can look to our public culture to see if it provides 
any guidance. Since our public culture is a dense, 
rich source of experiences, judgments, arguments and 
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opinions, it is unlikely that we will find ourselves at 
a loss if we have to resort to it to help the process 
of selecting principles along. This also means that 
wide reflective equilibrium is not a closed justifica-
tory system. Our public culture is constantly changing 
as it responds to the influences of new experiences and 
opinions. This is the open end of the system that al-
lows us to keep our theory of justice relevant to our 
changing concerns. This way of thinking implies 
finally that when we speak of 'Rawls' theory of social 
justice' we should keep in mind that the theory is not 
simply the contents of the book published in 1971 but 
those contents plus the changes and additions made by 
our public culture. These changes and additions would 
include those made by Rawls himself as well as all of 
the ideas compatible with the theory offered by other 
writers. To assess Rawls' theory as it presently 
stands then, we would have to take account of all of 
these writings as well. 
Now I would like to briefly compare this way of 
thinking about the task of constructing a theory of 
justice with a way of thinking that I associate with 
utilitarianism. For the purposes of this discussion I 
will define utilitarianism in terms of the classical 
principle of utility that Rawls discusses along with 
Brandt's idea that we need to find a way of standing 
outside our world in order to assess it. Now in terras 
of the kind of theory we have been exploring here it 
looks as if utilitarianism, at least as matters stand 
today, is not really a true competitor with the 
Rawlsian theory. Where is the kind of complex theory 
of political, economic and social relationships that we 
need? What set of institutions would utilitarians en-
dorse? Would they give a priority to liberty over the 
task of distributing income and wealth? This theo-
retical ambiguity may exist because of the magnitude of 
the task facing the utilitarian. He has to assess the 
complexities of our public culture armed with a prin-
ciple that demands that he calculate the happiness 
quotient or preference satisfaction level of all per-
sons who will be affected by the theory. Given this, 
it is not really surprising that although we have many 
answers to the difficult questions that have plagued 
political philosophy in the twentieth century, it is 
hard to find answers that are uniquely utilitarian. 
A utilitarian might reply that there is no lack of 
institutions or judgments of which the classical prin-
ciple of utility would approve. Take the example of 
the most important amendments in the Bill of Rights 
which I used earlier. A utilitarian might argue that 
these principles have worked well over a long period of 
time, many persons from different public cultures have 
found them to be congenial and hence they would likely 
be approved of by the principle of utility. The advan-
tage for the utilitarian of reasoning in this way is 
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that no precise calculation of the consequences that 
the amendments in question actually have on human hap-
piness or preferences need be made. The fact that our 
public culture approves of such judgments is taken as 
conclusive proof that they maximize human happiness. 
So the utilitarian neatly turns the tables by in effect 
telling his critics: What are you suggesting? That 
utilitarianism would disapprove of the Bill of Rights? 
The burden of contention is now on the critics of the 
utilitarian who (if they wish to demonstrate that util-
itarianism would not approve of some important consid-
ered judgment) must perform the complex calculation 
themselves. So the whole discussion proceeds at a very 
abstract level with the utilitarians relying on their 
intuitions as to what would be approved of by the prin-
ciple of utility. " 
But now we have to wonder why we need utilitarian-
ism at all. If all the theory does is tell us what we 
know already, that our considered public judgments are 
plausible candidates for principles of justice, then it 
does not really help us in any special way. We would 
do well just to concentrate on the problem of con-
structing a theory of justice from the standpoint of 
the initial situation before we take on the enormous 
task of trying to ascertain whether or not the arrange-
ment we come up with maximizes the happiness or the 
preference satisfaction of all the persons that it af-
fects. All in all, the kind of theory that develops 
from an interpretation of the initial situation is 
more likely to give us some substantive results than is 
the utilitarian theory. It would not be impossible of 
course to try to develop a detailed utilitarian theory 
of social justice but my basic point is that to assume 
that such a theory exists does us no good from the per-
spective of the initial situation. We need the theory 
in our hands so to speak, before we can consider it. 
If we keep the idea of interpreting the initial 
situation in mind, I think it is easier to understand 
why Rawls' theory is such a successful theory in the 
sense of being both popular and controversial. Because 
the theory gives a place to our considered judgments it 
can be applied to a wide range of problems. Because 
the theory asks that we check to see if the principles 
that the theory selects can be institutionalized, it 
can serve as a way of criticizing our current institu-
tions as we compare them against the set of institu-
tions that the theory would endorse. The theory also 
has appeal because it is practical. The fundamental 
perspective that the theory of justice originates from 
is the very situation we find ourselves in whenever we 
puzzle about questions of social justice. Thus many of 
the ideas and procedures in the theory are familiar 
ones. As Rawls says: 
The task is to articulate any public conception 
of justice that all can live with who regard 
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their person and their relation to society in a 
certain way. And though doing this may involve 
settling theoretical difficulties, the practical 
social task is primary. What justifies a concep-
tion of justice is not its being true to an order 
antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence 
with our deeper understanding of ourselves and 
our aspirations, and our realization that, given 
life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. 
We can find no better basic charter for our 
social world.'* 
For such a basic charter, we need look no farther 
than our own democratic public culture and its collec-
tive experience, knowledge, arguments and judgments. 
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